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INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF WATER
MARKETS IN THE AMERICAN WEST

system. Under the appropriative water rights regimes,
holders of senior water rights will receive their full
annual allocation before junior rights holders receive
any water. This means that during droughts, senior
rights holders may receive a full allocation and junior
rights holders may receive no water. Because many
urban centers hold junior rights and many agricultural
producers that grow low-value crops hold senior rights,
there are clear economic gains to be made from systems
that allow trade of water between users. Indeed, the
driving force for any water market is a difference in the
values of the water in use between two water users (for
general descriptions, see Hartman & Seastone, 1970;
Saliba & Bush, 1987; Howe et al., 1986). Note that this
does not mean that users must be systematically
different for gains from trade to be possible. Two farms
of the same size with identical cropping patterns will
both gain from trading water if they start with different
initial allocations of water (for example, if one is a
senior rights holder and the other a junior rights holder).

In the American West, there is a well-known divergence
between the spatial and temporal supply of surface
water and the demand of agricultural and urban users
for that water. In general, mountainous regions with
high precipitation and winter snowfall tend to be
sparsely populated or poorly suited to agriculture.
Conversely, large agricultural and urban centers have
often outgrown local water supplies.
Water for
agricultural, urban, and environmental uses is most
needed during precisely those summer months when
there is no precipitation. Historically, these concerns
have been addressed through the construction of largescale public water storage and distribution projects (for
general accounts, see Worster, 1985 or Reisner, 1986).
However, in recent years, increasing environmental
concerns and changes in the political climate have
reduced the feasibility of further dam building in the
American West. As a result, there has been an increase
in emphasis on institutions and mechanisms that attempt
to reallocate the limited available water supply amongst
competing users (Vaux & Howitt, 1984, Howe et al.,
1986).

Hence, in economic terms, the price at which water is
actually traded is unimportant. Trade is driven by
differences in the value of the water in use between two
potential traders. This value in use is quantified by the
value of the marginal product, namely the incremental
value of the increased output resulting from having an
additional unit of water. Thus, differences in the value
of the marginal product of water (VMP) are a
prerequisite for trade. Moreover, the difference in the
VMP between two potential traders must be larger than
any transaction costs that the traders incur in the course
of searching for trading partners. These transaction
costs include not only any transfer charges levied by
water districts and wheeling expenses, but also the costs
of finding suitable partners to effect a transaction.

What is the economic rationale underlying the
reallocation of water? In the United States (U.S.), water
rights are usufructuary, implying a right to use water
rather than outright ownership. In the arid West, the
institutions used to determine water rights are the result
of the historical interplay between the legacy of English
common law and the westward expansion of settlers,
agricultural and mining interests in the 19th century
(Anderson, 1983; Johnson & DuMars, 1989). As a
result, the distribution of the ownership of water rights
is quite distinct from the spatial pattern of potential
productivity of water. The most common water rights
system in the West is the appropriative, or queuing,

In an agricultural setting, a farmer’s VMP of water will
vary not only from year to year as a function of his
overall allocation and cropping decisions, but also
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throughout the growing season as the farmer adjusts to
changes in climate. In studying trading behavior in
water markets, it is critical to understand this distinction
between the price of water and its value in use. This
difference explains why at certain times of year or in
certain regions, “cheap” water can go unsold.

OVERVIEW OF THE WESTLANDS WATER
DISTRICT
The Westlands Water District is the largest district in
the Central Valley Project in California, serving nearly
eight hundred farms, which cover 600,000 acres. In
comparison to other water districts served by the Central
Valley Project, Westlands holds junior rights for its
water deliveries. Thus, in most years, it receives less
than its full allocation of 1,500,000 acre-feet (where
1AF equals 326,000 gallons of water). Because of its
size and its lack of senior water rights, Westlands is the
largest agricultural water markets in the United States.

Of course, there are many difficulties in establishing
functional water markets (Young, 1986; Frederick,
1986; Howitt, 1994). These range from the existence of
legal constraints on the transfer of water rights, to the
issue of third-party impacts, to the need for adequate
transportation capabilities if the water is to be
transported large distances. As a result, although a
number of water markets exist in the western U.S., they
have tended to be quite distinct in their nature and
institutional design (Saliba, 1987; Carey & Sunding,
2001). Some water markets, such as the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project in Colorado, have well-established
market prices and anonymous exchange between buyers
and sellers. Other markets, such as those found in the
Central Valley Project (CVP) in California, have no
such institutions (Carey & Sunding, 2001). Instead,
individual buyers and sellers must engage in costly
search to find trading partners, negotiate a price, and
effect the legal transfer of the water right. Despite these
high transaction costs, true arms -length transfers (as
opposed to barters between members of the same
kinship or corporate group) do still occur in informal
water markets without posted prices and a centralized
trading location. In this paper, we consider one such
informal water market, the Westlands water market in
the Central Va lley of California (Olmstead, 1998).
Westlands Water District is the largest agricultural
water district in the country. Moreover, because it holds
junior rights within the Central Valley Project
allocation, it represents an agricultural setting with
extreme water scarcity. As a result, there are few
administrative barriers to trading water between users
within the water district, and an active agricultural water
market exists. In terms of the volume of water traded,
this water market is the largest in the country. As such,
it offers a glimpse into the possible future of agricultural
water trading in California and elsewhere in the West.

Moreover, even within the Westlands Water District,
water is allocated according to a priority rights system,
with farms belonging to one of two main priority areas
(Olmstead, 1998; Carey and Sunding, 2001). The most
senior water right is priority area one, covering 337,000
acres. This land was part of the original Westlands
Water District, and under a 1963 contract with the
Bureau of Reclamation, is entitled to 900,000 acre-feet
of water in a full-delivery water year. This means that
farms with land in priority area one will receive 2.6
acre-feet of water per acre of land in full-delivery years.
Priority area two represents a more junior right than
priority area one. Covering 187,000 acres, this land was
originally part of the former Westplains Water District,
and was annexed to Westlands. Land in priority area
two is entitled to 250,000 acre-feet of water in a fulldelivery water year, corresponding to 1.3 acre-feet per
acre. Finally, there is also a priority area three, with the
most junior water rights. However, this area only
covers 10,000 acres, and will not be considered further
in this paper.
As previously mentioned, in a water queue system of
the kind found in Westlands, in a dry year, senior water
rights holders (in priority area one) may receive their
full allocation, while junior rights holders (those in area
two) receive a reduced allocation or none at all. The
water allocation in Westlands operates on a water year
basis, where the annual interval is defined from March
of one year to March of the following year (Carey &
Sunding, 2001). The Bureau of Reclamation typically
announces its annual allocation in several stages at the
beginning of the water year. Since Westlands Water
District operates a sophisticated hydraulic and metering
system, farms may take delivery of their allocation on
demand throughout the water year. Whether they use
all of it or not, farmers must pay for their entire water
allocation at the start of the water year. However,
depending on hydrological conditions and storage
capacity in the San Luis reservoir, a portion of each
farm’s allocation may be carried over into the following

Using water-trading data from Westlands for the period
1993-1996, we describe how seasonal and annual
changes in climate and the crop cycle interact with the
existing institutional mechanisms in Westlands to
determine trading behavior. Moreover, we discuss how
farmers of different sizes use the market and the role of
individual loyalty in determining how trading partners
are chosen in this informal market setting. Finally, we
discuss how changes in market structure could affect
Westlands farmers, and the possible distribution of these
changes.
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water year.
allowed.

In wet years, carry-over may not be

Carey and Sunding (2001). For the purposes of this
study, we have excluded all such internal transactions
between farms that belong to the same corporate entity
and are operated as a single unit. Instead, we consider
only those transactions where an arms -length transfer
between farms belonging to different networks
occurred. In 6481 of the 8611 trades during the four
water years 1993-1996, internal transfers occurred
between subunits of a larger network. This leaves 2130
trades where the two parties involved in the transaction
were distinct entities; that is to say, a true arms -length
transfer of water occurred.

Farms in all priority areas grow a variety of crop types,
including both annual and perennial crops.
In
particular, many of the farms in priority area two (with
junior water rights) have very good soils and grow high
value tree crops. Because the spatial distributions of
water queue priority and crop type are quite different, it
should be clear that there are significant gains to be
made from the trade of water rights. By purchasing
water in the water market, farms acquire an option that
expires at the end of the water year, when the original
allocation expires. Moreover, because water may only
be sold within the Westlands Water District, and all
deliveries are carefully metered, third-party effects are
negligible. As previously mentioned, there are few
administrative barriers to trading. Though there is no
formal water market, an active informal market
operates. This means that farmers wanting to trade
water must locate potential trading partners. This
informal market is referred to as a ‘coffee-shop market’
after the coffee shops where farmers meet to look for
trading partners and to negotiate trades.

Even when water is transferred between two
operationally distinct farms, trading may be undertaken
for a variety of reasons not related to differences in the
value of the water in use. For this study, we are
interested in transactions occurring at a point in time
between two distinct corporate entities, driven by
differences in the value of the marginal product of water
in use (VMP) between the two traders. Although it is
not possible to observe directly VMPs, the dataset used
in this study contains evidence for several
fundamentally different sorts of behavior, which are not
consistent with trading driven by differences in VMP.
Thus, as described below, we have excluded some of
the remaining 2130 trades.

THE WESTLANDS WATER MARKET, 1993-1996
The data used in this study are a subset of a larger
dataset containing farm-level information on every
water trade carried out in Westlands Water District for
the four water years from 1993 to 1996 (Olmstead,
1998). During this period, there were 8,611 recorded
transfers of water in Westlands Water District.
However, most of these trades do not represent market
transactions occurring between separate entities and
driven by differences in the value in use of water. This
situation is a result of farm acreage limitations
stipulated by the Reclamation Act of 1902 and
subsequently modified (Carey and Sunding, 2001).
Under the 1982 amendment to the Reclamation Act,
farms of less than 960 acres in size may receive Central
Valley Project at a reduced rate. Farms may purchase
water for use on acreage in excess of the 960-acre limit,
but must pay a higher rate for that portion of the water.
As a result of this pricing scheme, larger farms have
been parsed into 960-acre units and distributed amongst
family members and family trusts (Hundley, 1992).
This allows technical compliance with the 960-acre
limit; operationally the farms remain much larger.
Although on paper, there are eight hundred separate
farms in Westlands, these are grouped by common
ownership into around three hundred and fifty trading
networks. Farms within the same network may trade
water internally for efficiency reasons or tax purposes,
but in both cases, a true market transaction has not taken
place. Details of network transactions are given in

First, we have aggregated trades occurring on the same
date and between the same traders. Many of the traders
seem to parse large trades into many smaller trades that
take place simultaneously. While this is probably
related to field- or farm-level accounting, the underlying
transaction of interest is represented by the aggregate
amount.
Second, many transactions involve traders swapping the
same amount of water, but with differing vintages (a
sub-priority area classification).
Because the net
amount of water traded in such a pair of transactions is
zero, this cannot be motivated by differences in the
value of the water in use. Such swapping activity is
used to show a loss for tax purposes, by swapping a
“cheap” vintage for an “expensive” vintage, and is not
of interest in this study. Hence, we have removed all
swaps from the dataset.
Finally, the limited ability to carry over water into the
next water year drives lagged swapping. A trader who
is able to carry water over may buy rights from a trader
who cannot do so, and sell them back at the beginning
of the next water year. Again, differences in VMP do
not drive such swaps as the initial seller gets back
exactly the same amount of water that he sold, so that
the net amount traded is zero.
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Once these trading activities have been excluded, 1267
trades remain, which form the basic dataset used in this
study. Note that there exist several other activities, such
as short term speculation and long term rentals, which
are difficult to isolate, and thus may remain in the
dataset we have analyzed.

composed of a single subunit, denoted by a size of one.
The largest farm that traded had a size of 29, implying
that it is composed of 29 sub-farms, and encompasses
nearly 30,000 acres. The mean buyer size was 5.87 and
the mean seller size was 5.84; these are not significantly
different.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADERS IN THE
WESTLANDS WATER MARKET

In Westlands, water allocations are determined by
priority area. It is common for farms to hold land in
both junior and senior water rights area, and thus to
trade both junior and senior rights. Trading networks
may sometimes trade from subunits that are in a junior
rights area, and sometimes from subunits that are in a
senior rights area. We define a single water rights
priority area for each trading network as the mean of the
priority areas of those network subunits that traded.
This is intended to reflect the overall distribution of land
with trading potential between priority areas for each
trader. In the dataset, senior water rights are labeled as
area one and junior rights are labeled as area two. Thus,
the mean priority area of farms is a continuous variable
with a range from one to two. For buyers, the mean
priority area was 1.50, and for sellers it was 1.40. As
we might expect given a queuing system for water
allocation, buyers tended to have slightly more junior
rights than sellers.

Every trade in a market involves both a buyer and a
seller, and thus we can think of two sides to the market:
the buyers’ side and the sellers’ side. There is no
inherent reason that these two sides should be
symmetric; indeed we might expect to find systematic
differences between the kinds of trader who tend to buy
water and those who tend to sell water. In the following
discussion, we will describe characteristics of both sides
of the market. The 1267 water trades in the dataset
represent trading activity by 316 separate trading
networks (Table 1). Of these, 224 networks bought
water and 269 networks sold water in the four water
years from 1993 to 1996. Hence, 177 networks both
bought and sold water during the four-year interval
(Table 1). This does not imply extensive speculative
activity with simultaneous buying and selling because,
in almost all cases, networks alternated periods of
buying with periods of selling.

Given that the number of trades over the four-year study
period exceeds the number of distinct traders, most
traders participated in the market on more than one
occasion (Table 2). Nonetheless, the modal trading
frequency for both buyers and sellers was one: 58
buyers and 62 sellers only traded water once during the
four-year interval (Table 2). Whereas most traders
bought or sold water only a few times, a small number
of traders participated in the market on many occasions.
One buyer undertook forty purchases, and two sellers
each sold water on forty-one separate occasions (Table
2). Note that the mean frequency of purchases for
participating farms (1267/224 = 5.7) is higher than the
mean frequency of sales (1267/269 = 4.7). Using a ttest we test the null hypothesis that the two populations
of trading frequencies have the same mean: the tstatistic for this test is 1.70. Thus, at the 5 percent level,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the means are
the same.

There are approximately 350 potential traders in
Westlands as this is the total number of distinct trading
networks. Hence, roughly 90 percent of potential
traders in the Westlands Water District (316 out of 350)
actually participated in the water market in the period
March 1993 to February 1997. This percentage is very
high, given the informal market structure. The high
participation rate suggests that the ‘coffee-shop market’
is quite good at matching potential buyers and sellers.
However, in order to look at the distribution of benefits
from participation in the market, we must also look at
the frequency of participation and the amounts of water
traded. Note also that we only have data on trades that
did occur, and we have no information about refusals
and trades that did not occur, even though they might
have been profitable to both parties.
As mentioned previously, trading networks are
generally composed of several smaller farms, which
although legally distinct, are operational subunits of the
larger corporate entity. Each of these smaller farms is
usually 960 acres in size. A trading network of two
farms will generally have an aggregate acreage of 1920
acres, a three-farm network will have 2880 acres, and so
on. Thus, the number of farms in a trading network is a
rough measure of the total acreage of the network. The
smallest farms that traded water in Westlands were

In the months in which they traded, 66 percent of buyers
and 68 percent of sellers traded only once (Table 3).
Only 4 percent of buyers and 11 percent of sellers
traded more than three times in any month. The tstatistic for the null hypothesis that purchase and sale
frequencies have the same mean is 4.95. Thus, we
reject the null hypothesis: the mean monthly trading
frequency for buyers, 1.53, is significantly different to
that for sellers, 1.77. One possible explanation for this
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is that farms that are left with a large amount of unused
water towards the end of the water year are only able to
sell it in smaller units, as carryover water is inherently
less attractive to buyers.

following wet years (1995 and 1996). Because the pairs
of wet and dry years are broadly similar, for ease of
interpretation we have aggregated the two dry years
(1993 and 1994) and the two wet years (1995 and 1996)
in the following discussion.

ANNUAL AND SEASONAL TRADING
VARIABILITY

During the drought years, there were two peaks in the
monthly frequency of trades (Figure 1). The highest
frequency of trades occurred in February, and was
presumably related to the sale of unused options at the
end of the water year. A second, smaller, peak occurred
in August, and probably reflects high crop water
requirements in the middle of the summer. On the other
hand, there was much less variability in the mean trade
size by month in dry years (Figure 2). The smallest
mean trades occurred in February. As discussed
previously, this may reflect the inability of traders to
dispose of large amounts of water at the end of the
water year when the ability to carry it over is uncertain.
Mean trades in the summer were not different in size to
those occurring during the rest of the year. Hence, the
total amounts traded by month in the dry years show no
recognizable seasonal pattern (Figure 3).
It is
interesting to note that even during the drought years,
there was significant trading towards the end of the
water year, and at least some farmers had excess water
that they were willing to sell. This suggests that some
farmers may keep buffer stocks of water until late in the
growing season to cope with increases in crop water
demands from unexpected temperature changes.
Alternatively, trading late in the water year may reflect
the inability of some potential sellers to find trading
partners earlier in the year at the prices they are asking
for.

In Westlands, irrigated water is used as an input to
agricultural production. Crop water requirements vary
significantly throughout the year as a result of both
climatic and agronomic factors.
Because of this
variability, we would expect to see distinct cycles in
water trading activity. Moreover, the Central Valley
Project allocates water to Westlands on a water-year
basis, and this also affects trading activity through the
year.
As might be expected, the number of trades was higher
in the drought years (1993 and 1994) than in the
following wet years (1995 and 1996), but the mean
trade size was larger in wet years than in dry (Table 4).
For the drought years, Central Valley Project (CVP)
allocation to Westlands was 50 percent or less, whereas
in the wet years, Westlands received close to a full
allocation (Table 5). The total amount of water traded
in the market during the period 1993-1996 represented
between 8 percent and 15 percent of the total CVP
allocation in any year. Given that market trades
constitute a relatively small fraction of the total trading
activity, as discussed previously, this represents a
significant percentage of the total allocation, and
suggests that the informal market is reallocating water
quite successfully to higher values in use.
There is a distinct seasonality to water trading. Trades
in February, at the end of the water year, are attempts to
dispose of water options that are about to expire. Water
sold at this time of year may be carried over (if
permitted), used for preirrigation of fields, or used to
replenish ground water for those farmers that have
wells. Trading activity in March and April relates to
planning for the coming crop growing season. In the
Central Valley, there is generally no precipitation during
the summer months, so that summer trading is used to
compensate for crop water requirements resulting from
differences between expected and realized climate, or to
make up the shortfall between water input demand and
initial allocation.

During the wet years, trading frequencies in each month
were lower than in the same months during the drought
years (Figure 1). Once again, the highest frequency of
trades occurred in February. However, in 1995 and
1996, there was no pronounced increase in summer
trading frequencies, and with the exception of February,
trading frequencies remained quite constant throughout
the rest of the year. However, the monthly distribution
of mean trade sizes was bimodal. In the months from
April through August, the mean trade size was roughly
twice that found during the remaining fall and winter
months. The highest mean trade size occurred in
August, and the lowest in March, at the start of the
water year. As a result of this, there were two peaks in
the monthly trading totals during the wet years, ni
February and in August. The highest total volume
traded occurred in the month of February. This suggests
that during wet 1995 and 1996, some farmers in
Westlands had more than enough water to meet their
crop requirements, and had significant amounts of water
left over at the end of the water year.

Hence, there are two peaks in market trading activity,
one in the summer, when crop water requirements are
highest, and one in February of each year, just before
the end of the water year (Figure 1). Moreover, the
trading patterns observed have different characteristics
between the drought years (1993 and 1994) and the
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The larger mean trade size and lower trading frequency
in wet years compared to dry years both presumably
reflect changes in the overall availability of water in
Westlands (Table 5). We suggest that in wet years,
traders in the water market were unwilling to buy or sell
smaller amounts of water, as the spot market prices
would have been lower.
In order to overcome
significant transaction costs, transaction size had to
increase. It is interesting to note that in the dry years,
increased summer demand was met by increasing
transaction frequency, whereas in wet years, transaction
size increased. It is likely that during the dry years,
farmers requiring large amounts of water in the summer
had to enact many transactions with separate sellers,
none of who were willing to sell large amounts.

A striking feature of the normalized net trading data is
that for both dry and wet years, a significant number of
smaller farms appear to have traded quantities equal to
their entire CVP allocation on the water market (Figures
5a and 5b). For comparison, many of the crops
commonly grown in Westlands have water requirements
of 2.5 – 3.5 AF/acre of water applied for one harvest.
There are several possible reasons why farmers might
sell a large proportion of their annual allocation. If
anticipated water market prices are high enough,
farmers growing low value crops may idle some or all
of their land. Some farms have access to ground water
and crops that can tolerate irrigation with poorer quality
water (ground water in Westlands is somewhat saline).
Such farms may substitute pumped ground water for the
surface water allocation that is sold if spot market prices
are high enough. Finally, some of these farms may have
acreage in adjoining areas outside of Westlands, and
they may be larger farms than their landholdings in
Westlands would suggest. In this case, such farms
might also sell some portion of their allocation and then
bring in water from their entitlements outside of
Westlands if it is profitable to do so. Westlands does
not allow water to be exported from the water district
but there is no such restriction on importing water.

The previous discussion deals with trading patterns at an
aggregate level. Alternatively, we can look at the
annual trading activity for each farm that traded
(Figures 4 and 5). In this case, the variable of most
interest is the annual net trading of each farm; that is to
say, whether overall, farms sold or bought water over
the course of the water year. For both dry and wet
years, there is a wide distribution of net trading activity
at the farm level, with some farms in almost all size
categories being net sellers and others being net buyers
(Figures 4a and 4b). This is not surprising as the
priority area of the farms, and thus their initial
allocation, are not associated with their size. Moreover,
although we have no farm-level data on cropping
patterns in Westlands, farms of the same size grow quite
different crop types with widely differing crop water
requirements in terms of the timing and amount of
applied water. No systematic pattern of trading appears
as a function of farm size. The range of net trading
activity is much larger in the wet years than in the
preceding dry years, presumably reflecting the larger
overall availability of water and hence a greater
flexibility for farms to choose how to augment or reduce
their initial allocation (Figures 4a and 4b).

Conversely, those traders that are buying large amounts
of water are presumably growing crops with large water
input requirements on a large proportion of their land.
The observed pattern of trading suggests that small
farms that participated in the water market made far
larger adjustments to their production decisions than
large farms as a result of being able to trade. However,
this does not mean that the gains from trading in the
market were larger for small farms, as in general the
larger farms traded larger total amounts of water
(Figures 4a and 4b).
TRADING LOYALTY
Each of the 1267 transactions that occurred represents a
trading partnership between a buyer and a seller. Of
these partnerships, 729, or 58 percent of them, were
unique: the two traders involved had no further water
trades (Table 6). Fifteen percent of trades involved
traders who had traded with each other four or more
times. One trading partnership undertook ten separate
trades over the four-year period (Table 6). From this
data, we can look at the number of distinct trading
relationships that evolved over the study period. There
were 920 distinct trading relationships in the Westlands
water market during the period 1993-1996 (Table 6).
To put this in context, with 316 traders, the total
possible number of distinct trading relationships is
316!/(2!314!), or 49770 relationships. Thus, 1.8 percent
of all possible trading relationships are represented in

Because subunits within a trading network are in
general 960 acres apiece, it is possible to normalize the
net trading data by overall acreage and to consider what
proportion of their initial allocation farms traded in the
water market. Recall that the full allocation for farms
wholly in priority area one is 2.6 acre feet per acre of
land, and for farms wholly in area two, it is 1.3 acre feet
per acre of land. In 1995 and 1996, CVP allocations to
Westlands were essentially 100 percent (Table 5),
whereas in the preceding drought years, allocations
were 50 percent or less. Because of the water queuing
system, the cutbacks in drought years would have been
allocated asymmetrically between the junior and senior
water rights holders.
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the data. If there were no repeated trading relationships,
we would see 1267 separate trading relationships in
1267 trades, which would represent 2.5 percent of
possible relationships. The difference between this
percentage and the 1.8 percent actually observed is a
reflection of trader loyalty in the market. These
numbers suggest that loyalty to previous trading
partners is a major determinant of future trading
choices. Moreover, during the four-year period for
which we have data, larger farms traded more often than
smaller farms. One way of thinking about this is that
the farms that did trade in any month were on average
larger than those farms that did not trade. Smaller farms
participated significantly less often in the informal
water market. It is possible to imagine that this is
because smaller farms are less able to cope with the risk
of committing to production levels or crop types that
require significant trading activity away from their
initial water allocation. However, the data presented
here (Figures 5a and 5b) suggest that at least some small
farms relied on the water market to procure supplies of
water quite different to their initial allocation.
Certainly, as a result of water market participation, these
farms altered their production decisions far more than
larger farms that traded water. Alternatively, smaller
farms may be unable to commit the human capital
necessary to engage in costly search and the
establishment of extensive trading relationships, even
though the potential gains are large.

there are also large benefits from trading to those farms
that participate.
During the study period, larger farmers traded more
often than smaller farms, and traded larger quantities.
The introduction of new institutions or technologies to
improve the efficiency of the market would certainly
improve the aggregate benefits of trading.
The
distribution of these additional benefits is less clear. As
the current informal market appears to favor large
farmers, it is likely that smaller farmers in Westlands
would benefit more than large farmers under a system
with a centralized exchange, brokers and market
clearing prices. Because a significant percent of the
annual allocation is already traded (Table 5), it is even
possible that large traders would be worse off under a
centralized exchange system, as they would no longer
be differentiated from any other trader.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Many studies of water marketing focus on trading
between agricultural and urban users. In particular, a
very large difference between traders in the value of
water in use is often cited as a prerequisite to overcome
the significant transaction costs associated with water
marketing. However, this study describes a robust
agricultural water market between agricultural water
users in a single water district. Even though all
agricultural producers in Westlands Water District are
relatively homogeneous (when compared to potential
urban water traders), trading is routine and pervasive.
Moreover, this trading occurs without many of the
institutions of a well-developed market such as a
centralized exchange and posted prices. During the
study period, ninety percent of farms in Westlands
participated in the informal water market. A significant
proportion of the total annual CVP allocation was traded
each year (Table 5). Trading patterns suggest that some
farms rely on the water market to allow crop production
choices (and concomitant capital investment) that would
be impossible without trading. Overall, the amount of
water traded between farms each year in Westlands is
large (often more than 100,000 AF) suggesting that
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Table 1. Westlands water market structure by trader activity, 1993-1996.

Total number of traders
Total number of buyers
Total number of sellers
Buyers who also sold
Buyers who did not sell
Sellers who did not buy

316
224
269
177
47
92

Table 2. Frequency of market participation for buyers and sellers.

Frequency of
participation

Number of
buyers

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
26
29
32
35
39
40
41

Total

Number of
sellers

58
37
24
14
15
13
10
6
7
8
6
4
1
4
1
3
0
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
0

62
50
42
28
27
11
12
2
4
6
2
3
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
2

224

269

11

Table 3. Monthly transaction frequency by trader.
Monthly frequency
of transactions

Number of
buyers

Number of
sellers

863
230
123
28
15
0
0
8
1267

830
204
90
56
25
48
14
0
1267

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Table 4. Water market trades by water year, Westlands Water District.
Water year

Trades

Mean(AF)

Max(AF)

Min(AF)

Total(AF)

1993
1994
1995
1996

428
348
287
204

257.8
176.4
550.3
542.0

5000
1743
10000
13000

1
1
1
1

110329
61373
157939
10570

Table 5. Water market trading as a percentage of yearly Central Valley Project allocation.
Water year

Trades(AF)

1993
1994
1995
1996

110,329
61,373
157,939
110,570

Allocation(AF)
750,000
637,500
1,500,000
1,425,000

Allocation percent

Traded percent

50.0 percent
42.5 percent
100.0 percent
92.5 percent

14.7 percent
9.6 percent
10.5 percent
7.8 percent

Table 6. Trading loyalty, Westlands water market.
Numb er of transactions
between trading partners

Frequency

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

729
238
105
60
60
12
28
16
9
10
1267

12

Distinct trading
relationships
729
119
35
15
12
2
4
2
1
1
920

Figure 1. Frequency of trades by month, Westlands water market
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Figure 2. Mean trade size, acre feet/month, Westlands water market
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Figure 3. Total acre feet traded by month, Westlands water market
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Figure 4a. Net trade size by farm size, dry years (1993-1994)
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Figure 4b. Net trade size by farm size, wet years (1995-1996)
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Figure 5a. Net trade size, AF per acre, dry years (1993-1994)
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Figure 5b. Net trade size, AF per acre, wet years (1995-1996)
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